The two-state solution will prevent another October 7. Interview with Dr. Michael Milstein

Reserve Colonel Dr. Michael Milstein used to be the head of the Palestinian section in the Israeli Military Intelligence (Aman) and served as an advisor to the government coordinator for activities in the territories. In an interview with Gabi Wolfson, Milstein talks about Hamas, its leaders and hierarchy, the Palestinian reaction to the events of October 7, and the conclusions Israel should draw.

Mr. Milstein, I want to start with the negotiations in Qatar and the possibility of a long-term ceasefire. I want to understand, with your help, what is going on in Yahya Sinwar's mind. What is he thinking about now?

I think it's important to note two things here. First, Sinwar doesn't have much to do with what's happening in Qatar. The heads of the intelligence services of four states - Israel, the USA, Egypt, and Qatar itself - are orchestrating the entire event. They negotiate about everything there. I see a contradiction between what Qatar and Sinwar aim for. I am now speaking more about my own assessment than insider information. I am convinced that Sinwar is experiencing a kind of euphoria. He believes his successes are much more valuable and essential than the price he pays. Yes, there are thousands killed in Gaza, and yes, there is unimaginable destruction. He lost many important people. But all of this is justified in the face of the 'historic success' he believes he achieved as a result of the October 7 attack and, of course, the deals made after that.

On the other hand, Qatar is in panic. Qatar understands that its main asset - Hamas's power in Gaza - could be shaken. And Qatar likely wants a deal much more than Sinwar. I mean a big deal - 'everyone in exchange for everyone.' If such a big deal is made, Sinwar will lose his main advantage - the ability to act against Israel actively, using the hostages as an ace up one's sleeve. Then, nothing will stop Israel from attacking him.

But in the case of the 'everyone in exchange for everyone' deal, Sinwar wins the main thing – his life. He stays alive, and what's left of Hamas continues to control Gaza.

I'm not sure it's all that simple, and I'm not sure Sinwar relies on Israel more than Israel relies on Sinwar. Do you think he isn't concerned about the possibility that Israel, after releasing hostages and setting all terrorists free, will launch a rocket at his home? It seems that Sinwar now primarily wants an extension of the ceasefire, turning it into a permanent one. And secondly, he wants to ensure his own survival by not making a major deal. He will act step by step, leaving much room for uncertainty and the possibility to maneuver. All with one single goal – not to allow Israel to achieve its main intention: to overthrow Hamas's power in Gaza.

When discussing Sinwar's intention to secure a ceasefire, are you talking about weeks or months?

If possible, years. But without a major deal. One must understand how the minds of Islamists work. One of their favorite expressions is: "Allah is with the patient." You don't know what will happen in a minute, but you try to win time: another day, another hour. No one knows what will happen next, but you are gaining time now. And Sinwar wants to use this time to gradually, step by step, change the situation in his favor. Israel is facing tough dilemmas – both public and political.

On the one hand, Ben-Gvir is already talking about leaving the government if a ground operation is not resumed; on the other hand, there is pressure from the USA. "If you are going to act in the southern sector, do it more carefully," and so on. In other words, we no longer have the unequivocal support we had in the first 54 days. And Sinwar tells himself, "I will win another day, another two, any day is a day in my favor." Right now, he talks about four days. Beyond that – Allah is great.

In other words, Sinwar wants to avoid a major deal. He wants many small deals to buy time.

Yes, I am sure that's his logic. Remember 'One Thousand and One Nights'? For him, every night or every day is a new story, a new tale, a new deal. At the same time, he is constantly preparing to resume the war. He doesn't rest on his laurels; he is ready. It's a dangerous situation, and I hope the IDF is prepared. If Sinwar realizes that the resumption of war is more likely than another deal, he may strike first. He won't wait for the IDF to act, and we may find ourselves in a situation similar to October 7. Primarily, he could target IDF soldiers currently in the city of Gaza. It's a very dangerous situation.

A preemptive strike by Sinwar.

This is Yahya Sinwar. This is how he thinks; this is how his mind works. There are no terms like 'treaty' or 'agreement.' All those terms we operate with are foreign to him.

What about self-preservation and survival? Let's go back to October 7. When he decided to attack Israel, did he consider the consequences even for himself personally? Was he concerned about being annihilated?

Sinwar is a fatalist. In his consciousness, there is a conviction that he was born and lives with one singular purpose – to promote the ideas of jihad for the liberation of all 'Palestine,' primarily Jerusalem. Yes, he considers the possibility that he might die, that his entire family might perish and that people close to him might die. But this is a price he is willing to pay. One must understand the Islamist mindset. Unlike us, they don't have concepts like 'war exit strategy,' 'scenario development,' etc. The action itself, jihad, is the most crucial. And so it was on October 7. He understood perfectly well that Israel would respond with full force. He didn't think sending three thousand – or however many – militants to commit war crimes and atrocities of great magnitude was another round of escalation. He understood perfectly well what was at stake.

Did he consider the possibility that Gaza would be virtually destroyed?

He considered that there would be huge sacrifices. But he made two cardinal mistakes, which are entirely uncharacteristic of him. He spent 23 years in an Israeli prison; he knows Israel and Israeli society very well. He made two gross errors in his assessment of the situation. First of all, he believed Israeli society to be weaker than it turned out to be. Remember Nasrallah's speech in 2000 when he compared Israel to a spider's web? Sinwar thought roughly the same about Israel. That it was an artificial entity that could be defeated. He was also convinced that Israel would not withstand such a high number of casualties and a war that would last so long. I don't think he regrets it. These people never repent. From his point of view, everything was done right, and 15,000 casualties – an entirely acceptable price. Even the destruction in Gaza is a worthy price. Now, he is planning his next steps.

He's not a politician, you mean.

He's an ideologist. For people of his kind, life is dedicated to one goal, and there is no other. He won't leave his post as long as he lives. It's an entirely different form of thinking than what we're accustomed to. Therefore, evaluating the current situation, he doesn't panic. Yes, this war is probably longer and harder than he assumed, but both he and Mohammed Deif, the head of Hamas's military wing, consider October 7 the right move, and for them, it's a gigantic achievement – despite the consequences.

Hamas is not just Sinwar or Mohammed Deif. It includes Khaled Mashal, Ismail Haniyeh, and others. Who is playing the lead role in this war?

The strategy of this war is determined by three individuals: Khaled Mashal, Ismail Haniyeh, and another crucial figure - Saleh al-Arouri, the deputy chairman of Hamas's political bureau. He is in Lebanon and communicates with Iran from there. Sinwar keeps them informed about the current situation. Even during the most intense bombings and attacks, communication channels between Sinwar and this trio were always active. Now, during the lull, even more so. Sinwar provides them with information, and together, they decide on the strategy of military actions and hostage release deals. In Islamist movements, the term "consensus" is crucial. Even if there are disagreements - and there are not many now - they reach a unified opinion, and the dissenting party accepts the majority's will.

Is there consensus regarding the attack on October 7?

I believe so. No one there will stand up and loudly or quietly say it shouldn't have been done. Moreover, I am convinced that they all knew about the impending attack.

Did Hamas leaders outside of Gaza know?

I assume they did. The Prime Minister of Qatar did try to absolve them in an interview a few days ago, hinting that it was Sinwar's personal initiative. Don't ask us to expel them from our territory; they only do 'political work.' Apart from the apparent cynicism, it's also an attempt to whitewash themselves. But from Hamas's point of view, it's entirely clear that an operation like this could not have been carried out without consultations and approval. We are dealing with an action of historical scale, perhaps the largest one in the history of this movement.

For many years, there were reports of disagreements between 'Gaza Hamas' and 'Hamas abroad." Were they fake all of a sudden?

Let's put it this way: there were disputes and disagreements in the past. No one resigned, but there were disagreements. Now, there aren't any, and most likely there can't be. From their perspective, Hamas is in an excellent position. They just need to prepare for the next strategic move. That's what they are concerned about. Earlier, one could talk about more radical forces or less radical ones. Today, all distinctions have blurred; everyone follows the same line.

From the perspective of the people in Gaza, are they also in an excellent position? It's challenging to answer on behalf of two million people, but is Hamas popular? Are its actions supported in Gaza?

The answer to these questions is the same. It's simply irrelevant. It doesn't matter. In recent weeks, I spoke with those I considered my friends in the Gaza Strip until recently. I'm not sure I can still consider them as such now. I asked them, "Hamas is causing you unimaginable suffering. It's destroying your entire life. Why doesn't anyone, not a single person, speak out?" And I'm not talking about expressing solidarity with people in Israel. I'm talking about an attempt to improve their own lives. There is no real answer. Nothing. Firstly, they are deathly afraid of Hamas. This argument doesn't seem convincing to me, but it exists. The main – and especially problematic – point is their hatred for Israel, hundreds of times more potent than their aversion to Hamas. So when I read various articles about discontent brewing in Gaza, about boiling resentment, I ask – where is this happening? These voices may be brewing, but we hear entirely different voices.

Were you surprised by the fact that not only Hamas terrorists but also the so-called civilian population took part in the attack on Israel?

Thousands. Thousands of people. I don't have data on how many had worked in Israel before. Still, thousands of people participated in the attack. There are surviving Israelis who have been attacked, robbed, and assaulted by ordinary residents of Gaza. Some dragged the bodies of the deceased into Gaza. Bodies. Perhaps hoping it would bring some benefit.

And this didn't surprise you?

Honestly, no. I've been communicating with them for too long. The aversion to Israel is at an incomprehensible level. And it's not just Hamas. It's in families, it's in schools, it's in the neighborhood. It's everywhere. If something surprised me, it was the scale of the atrocities, the degree of cruelty. I always knew they were capable of cruelty, but what we witnessed exceeded anything I could have imagined. It was absolutely monstrous sadism, surpassing everything we had seen or could imagine. So the shock was intense, but it was about the level of cruelty, not the fact of the rampage itself.

Did the notion that people in Gaza are just like us and want to work, earn a living, and raise children collapse? It turns out that, above all, they want to kill us.

To cope with this notion, I have been urging people to learn Arabic and study the codes and history of Islam for 20 years now. Shalom Hanoch has a song: "Your enemy is a strange person, just like you." No, they're not the same. They are entirely the same from a biological point of view. But from a conscious perspective – no. They are not ready to talk to you about anything even remotely related to peace. They don't consider the economy something fundamental in life. Things like morality, truth, and empathy are simply unfamiliar to them. We are different. We are entirely different.

By "they" or "them," do you mean the residents of Gaza as well as the residents of Ramallah?

Unfortunately, yes. I know how children are raised in PNA schools and how public discourse sounds. The difference lies in opportunities. In Judea and Samaria, there are no cars from which RPGs are launched and no rocket launchers because we control that territory. But if they had the opportunity, I assure you – the situation there wouldn't be much different from what's happening in Gaza.

So if we leave Judea and Samaria, Kfar Saba turns into Qalqilya.

No doubts. And therefore, the main conclusion that needs to be drawn, from now on and forever, is that Palestinian territories cannot control the borders. This idea is dead. The main reason that allowed Hamas to transform from a terrorist organization into an army is control over the Philadelphi Route. Whatever the outcome of the war in Gaza will be, this must change. Israel and effective international forces should control this area. But when it comes to Judea and Samaria, I have nothing against autonomy or even a state there. Still, this state should not control the Jordanian border. This state should have no connection with the outside world. Even in this case, severe security threats await us. But even thinking about entrusting them with any responsibility for this issue is unthinkable because they will instantly use it to create severe threats to the existence of Israel.

Birzeit University conducted a survey, and 75% of Arab residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza supported the events of October 7. Do you find these results reliable?

The support is even higher.

To such an extent?

I practically live in the Palestinian segment of social networks. I searched and dug deep to find even one minimally known influential person who would speak out and condemn the attack. Nobody condemned what they did to women and children. No one. Mansour Abbas was the only one who said something. But he was in Israel. On the very first day, he said that it was a crime against humanity, against Islam. Everyone else, both in the Arab community and certainly in the Palestinian community, did not utter a word. Intellectuals, journalists, writers. Anyone? No one. Therefore, unfortunately, the survey you mentioned seems quite realistic to me. And, unfortunately, it appears that our two peoples cannot live together. We must be separated. We need to part ways, not deliberately mix.

What is the practical conclusion?

There are several practical conclusions. Firstly, Netanyahu's hope that normalization of relations with the Arab world can be promoted, leaving the Palestinian issue aside, is an illusion. Besides, it exploded, severely injuring all of us. Secondly, as I mentioned, we cannot live together. What Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are promoting – a single state from the sea to the Jordan – will only lead to one thing: a constant repetition of the nightmares of October 7. That's what it will look like. And thirdly, when a Palestinian state is established, it cannot be entirely free. It will have to be under some form of Israeli control. Complete freedom for Palestinians is a threat to our existence.

Seventy-six years have passed since the adoption of the UN resolution on the creation of the state of Israel. The Arabs rejected this resolution and attacked Israel. Palestinian Arabs still refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist as a national state. Is there a reconsideration of positions in the Arab community? Do they regret their attack in 1947?

Unfortunately, no. In Palestinian culture, it is not customary to look at yourself from the outside or put yourself in the other's shoes. And there is a strong culture of self-pity, cultivating the victim within. This is typical not only of Palestinians but also of the whole Arab world. No, they don't think they were wrong in 1947. They don't think they were wrong in 2000 when they rejected Ehud Barak's proposal. They don't think they were wrong at any crossroads when they rejected compromise, resorted to violence, and suffered defeat every time. We must recognize that this is in the DNA of their consciousness.

Let's imagine that any Prime Minister of Israel listens to our entire conversation and asks you for a solution.

First of all, Hamas must disappear as a political and military phenomenon in the Gaza Strip.

Let's assume it's gone. What's next?

Five minutes after that, we must sit down at the negotiating table and engage in what we dislike so much – long-term planning. We must outline the borders of separation from the Palestinians. Separation is the keyword. Two main principles should be at its core. Firstly, Palestinians will not have the opportunity to freely contact the outside world, only under our control. Secondly, wherever possible, we should establish the borders by agreement with the other party. I'm not naive and understand very well that the other side will not agree to anything. But we must try, and if it does not work, then act unilaterally. Yes, this will involve the need to evacuate individual settlements.

It's a challenging task.

It is not easy, but it is the next task facing the Zionist movement. We must start taking action. Take our destiny into our own hands and not wait for another October 7 to collapse on us and force us to make decisions.