Amid the conflict in Gaza, tensions are escalating along the Lebanese border. Are we on the brink of a full-scale war in the north?
Professor Eyal Ziser, an orientalist and lecturer at Tel Aviv University, expressed his views in an interview with NEWSru.co.il.
Interview conducted by Gabi Wolfson.
Professor Ziser, I'd like to hear your assessment of the current situation. We frequently hear the phrase "Gaza comes first" and the emphasis on channeling efforts toward Gaza. However, it appears that a conflict in the north is already underway - albeit without an official announcement from our side.
Everything is a matter of proportions. If what is happening there today had occurred on the border with Lebanon three months ago, undoubtedly, we would have been referring to it as a war. We vividly remember the nature of the conflict in Lebanon. However, since October 7, the situation's proportions have shifted somewhat. Presently, a confrontation exists there; indeed, it has persisted since day one. It operates within explicit frameworks and boundaries, with both sides endeavoring not to breach these limits. There are combat operations and a concentration of troops at the border, but considering the standards of the State of Israel, this stands as a limited-scale conflict—a border dispute.
When referring to the boundaries of a conflict, what precisely do you mean?
They shell our territory, reaching several kilometers in depth, and fire at our soldiers. In response, we also engage, targeting several kilometers deep into Lebanese territory, aiming at Hezbollah operatives. It is within this context that everything unfolds.
In other words, do you think the conflict has expanded beyond limits, involving larger-scale attacks on civilians?
The conflict's boundaries have been established since day one and remain mostly unchanged. Occasionally, there are accidental breaches by either side. However, the overall parameters stay intact. We strike several kilometers deep into their territory, they retaliate within ours, and the cycle continues.
A few days ago, a senior Hezbollah figure said that early in the war they approached Hamas asking if they were interested in Hezbollah getting more involved, and Hamas allegedly refused.
This is an obvious lie.
Can you tell us about the relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah?
At first glance, they appear to be allies. But it is clear that they are not closely related, as each organization has its own interests.
Hezbollah is a Shia organization supported and funded by Iran, while Hamas, also backed by Iran, is a Sunni organization with its own distinct goals.
Hezbollah is ready to give money, ready to give weapons, but is not at all interested in its people dying for Hamas. At the same time, there is significant pressure on Hezbollah to increase their assistance to Hamas in Gaza.
Everyone sees that Hezbollah is not an obstacle for us in Gaza. We are not refusing any steps or actions but Hezbollah is questioned on their stance. Today, Nasrallah is cautious because he doesn't want Beirut to become like Gaza.
Wasn't he afraid of this in 2006? Despite all the criticism, can we argue that the Second Lebanon War established a specific deterrent factor that continues to influence events today?
From 2006 until recently, we experienced a period of relative calm in the north. Additionally, it's crucial to remember that the alterations to the rules of engagement in 2006 were a result of our initiative.
Israel was the one who started the war, not Hezbollah. Nasrallah kidnapped our soldiers. This was not the first time this had been done, and until then Israel had not responded. Nasrallah believed that we would not answer this time either. He was mistaken, in fact he admitted it himself, saying that if he had known how Israel would react, he would not have kidnapped the soldiers.
Since then, calm has prevailed on the border precisely because Nasrallah is more cunning than the Hamas leaders. He takes the public opinion of the Shiite community in Lebanon into account and avoids causing destruction if it doesn't yield any parallel results.
Today, when sitting in a bunker, what do you think Nasrallah is thinking about?
About how to cause maximum trouble to Israel without dragging Lebanon into a destructive war. About how to constantly harass Israel, as they did in the months leading up to the war, without causing a situation where Israel has no choice but to respond, which would lead to the destruction of Lebanon.
What about the declarations from Israeli leaders regarding their intention to push Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani?
So what? Do you believe all the statements of Israeli leaders? I don't and neither does Nasrallah.
Do you think it's possible for a scenario where this war ends, yet Hezbollah remains stationed on our northern borders?
I wouldn't want it to be like that, but I can't say with certainty that this won't happen. It wouldn't surprise me if it does.
The truth is that the sole method to achieve results seems to be through the use of force. Only when Israel explicitly states, "Gentlemen, retreat beyond the Litani. If you refuse, we will enter Lebanon, accepting all the resulting consequences," can a change occur.
Not through diplomacy?
I don't believe in this. Perhaps I'm mistaken, and I would be glad to be wrong, but I simply don't believe it. The primary question is who will yield first. If we don't demonstrate our seriousness, why would the other party succumb to diplomatic pressure?
Don't Israel's actions today show Nasrallah that we are serious?
So far, we've only been restraining ourselves and reacting. We aren't initiating attacks; instead, we're holding back and responding to provocations. While the IDF is performing well, there's still no indication that we're prepared for a significant confrontation on Lebanese territory. Nasrallah is biding his time. He's observing what the Americans are permiting us, he's noticing how the stalemate in Gaza is draining our resources, and he thinks to himself that his moment may not even come.
Isn't the American military presence a signal to him regarding the seriousness of our intentions?
Not at all. Americans repeatedly emphasize that they do not want war. Why should he be concerned? Furthermore, the years following the Second Lebanon War restored Nasrallah's confidence.
Were we wrong all these years? Do you think it was necessary to launch a preemptive strike, despite all the potential consequences?
Nasrallah has maintained peace and quiet all these years. When you allow a monster to grow and develop beside you, why be surprised? We have allowed the missile threat to grow to its current proportions. However, initiating a war without international support, especially when it's evident that the United States and other countries won't understand or endorse it, poses a problem.
Additionally, starting a war without a consensus and legitimacy within Israeli society is problematic. It took events like October 7 and the loss of 1,400 lives for something to change within Israeli society, for there to be public legitimacy for such actions.
Let's revisit Lebanon. What is the extent of Nasrallah's popularity in Lebanese society by the end of 2023?
Most Lebanese are not Shia and are not very sympathetic to Nasrallah. He is the leader of the Shiite society; they do not know or imagine any other leader. Consequently, even though they are not enthusiastic about the possibility of war, Nasrallah's leadership in Lebanon lacks an alternative, allowing him to act with confidence.
Is there no alternative to Nasrallah in Lebanon?
I mean within the Shiite environment, undoubtedly. Iranian money and military power establish him as the undisputed leader of the Shiite community. In general, Shiites comprise 30% of Lebanese society. While the majority are not Shiites, they don't possess an arsenal of 150,000 rockets. The combination of money and missiles allows him to maintain actual power in the country.
Elections hold little sway there. The political system is gridlocked, and the country, governed like the "Agudat Israel" party, functions as a nation of ethnic groups. The Shiites follow him as a flock follows a shepherd, firmly believing he will protect and empower them. Even the occasional disasters he brings upon them do not alter this perception. They lack an alternative and willingly accept his leadership. They are compelled to live with it.
You mentioned the paralysis of the political system in Lebanon. What does this paralysis entail?
There is no president, and the prime minister is in an acting capacity. This situation is a consequence of internal strife. In Lebanon, each ethnic group resides in its own region, leading an autonomous way of life. Unfortunately for us, the area bordering Israel is predominantly Shiite and consequently under the influence of Hezbollah.
How would you define the relationship between Nasrallah and Iran?
I don't agree with the notion that Nasrallah is a subordinate of the Iranian leaders. I would say he is one of them. He has been in the arena for so long... Many of the Iranian leaders who were there when he began his journey are no longer present. The Iranians treat him with respect, not as a secondary ally or subordinate.
What do you think is more important to him: being a Lebanese politician or being an ally of Iran?
This is the main dilemma. Sometimes one side takes over, sometimes the other. It seems to me that his Shia identity and loyalty to Iran are more important to him than his Lebanese identity, but he navigates between the two. He is playing some kind of game. Most Lebanese Shiites also feel Lebanese, so he plays the game that is expected of him.
How significant is the threat of an outbreak on the Syrian border?
Bashar al-Assad will never forgive Hamas for supporting his opponents during the civil war. But he depends on Iran, on Hezbollah. However, he does not fully control its territory. He does not want war (with Israel), but he is not able to completely prevent the actions of pro-Iranian forces. Pro-Iranian armed groups have been present since the civil war began. Hezbollah, too, has been operating in the region since then, and Iranian advisers continue to remain there. Iran possesses influence in this regard. While I don't perceive this as a significant threat, there have already been instances of gunfire originating from that area, and such incidents are likely to persist. However, I believe that Bashar Assad is disinclined toward initiating a full-scale war that would involve crossing the border.
What influence does Russia have on the events unfolding in Syria?
Russia is in Syria, we respect that, but its influence is not so great. How many soldiers do they have there, how many planes? Not a number that can be significant against the background of thousands of Iranian soldiers and fighters of pro-Iranian paramilitary forces.
Russia provides support to Bashar al-Assad, but will not be able to block the Iranians, whose presence is much more noticeable and tangible. Well, in general, Russia looks at everything today through the prism of confrontation with the United States. If the US is against Hamas, then they are for it.
Is a war in the north inevitable?
Given the events in Gaza, the opposing side won't actively pursue it. The real question is: what are our objectives and what do we aim to achieve? No one desires a full-scale war, yet when everyone engages in risky behaviors, escalation becomes a swift possibility.
In order to achieve serious results, actions are needed that require US support, the legitimation of Israeli society, and Israelis would need to be willing to take a blow. The current situation is bad, but the whole question is what is the alternative. The government exists in order to make these decisions. However, the task they're facing is very difficult.
