Negotiations with Hamas and Beirut, Ankara's boycott, and Riyadh's conditions: What has happened in the Middle East
Expert on Arab affairs Marianna Belenkaya writes about the ceasefire negotiations, the future of Saudi-Israeli normalization, Israel–Turkey relations and possible war with Lebanon
Virtually all of this week's news in the Middle East revolved around negotiations for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, with information constantly changing. According to media leaks on Friday morning, Hamas was inclined to reject the deal, but mediators asked the movement's leaders to reconsider. At the same time, Hamas is increasingly insisting on involving Turkey as a guarantor of both its future and the future of the Gaza Strip. However, it is unlikely that Israel will accept it. Recently, Ankara has not even attempted to appear neutral. Just this week, Turkey halted all trade with Israel and joined South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, this week showed that the development of events in the Gaza Strip affects the issue of Saudi-Israeli normalization, as well as the prospects for de-escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli border. These signals were sent to Israel from Washington, Paris, Riyadh, and Beirut.
Ceasefire negotiations
Information regarding ceasefire negotiations in the Gaza Strip and the return of Israeli hostages changed rapidly this week. Reports indicated that Hamas responded negatively to the conditions proposed by Israel. At the same time, other statements suggested a positive attitude from the movement.
On Friday morning, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, known for its connections to Hezbollah and other regional "resistance forces," clarified the situation based on its sources: Hamas reacted negatively to Israeli proposals, but mediators in Egypt and Qatar asked the movement's leaders to delay their response, which led to continued efforts to find a formula acceptable to both sides. It is also reported that Cairo has obtained an Israeli promise to postpone the start of operations in Rafah, in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, at least until the end of next week.
The potential compromise remains unclear. Hamas consistently insists on the complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza, though it is willing to wait for this under the guarantee that military actions will not resume. However, this is entirely unacceptable to Israeli authorities. During their meeting in Jerusalem this week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the stance to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. All other issues are, more or less, negotiable.
Blinken's visit and Saudi-Israeli normalization
Secretary of State Antony Blinken started his latest trip to the Middle East in Saudi Arabia, followed by visits to Jordan and Israel.
Early in the week, Riyadh hosted a special session of the World Economic Forum attended by dozens of politicians from about 60 countries, including 12 heads of state and over 200 high-ranking officials. Various events took place on the sidelines of the session, including Blinken's meetings with his Gulf counterparts, Arab-European talks, and a session of the Arab ministerial committee, including representatives from Turkey. Almost everywhere, the situation in the Gaza Strip was a primary topic of discussion.
After the meeting of Arab and Islamic countries, chaired by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, the international community was called on to "impose effective sanctions against Israel, including halting arms supplies, in response to violations of international law" in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
During the events, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud confirmed Riyadh's commitment to achieving a final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the recognition of the State of Palestine. This issue was also a major topic during Blinken's discussions with representatives of Arab countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. A recurring theme was the notion that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state would weaken extremist forces in the region, including Hamas and Iran. It was reiterated that no Arab party wants to get involved in resolving issues in the Gaza Strip without a clear plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace. This also applies to the normalization process between Israel and Arab countries, starting with Saudi Arabia.
According to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, Riyadh has three demands for Israel: to withdraw forces from the Gaza Strip, stop settlement construction in the West Bank, and start the process of establishing a Palestinian state within three to five years. Additionally, the Palestinian Authority was demanded to undertake reforms to create a governance apparatus that would be trusted by Palestinians themselves as well as by Israel.
Normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel was initially conceived as a tripartite deal. In exchange for establishing diplomatic relations with the Israelis, Riyadh wanted to secure a new security agreement and assistance in developing a civilian nuclear program from Washington. As Faisal bin Farhan announced in late April, Saudi Arabia and the US have completed much of the work on the security agreements. However, they have not seen progress from Israel on the Palestinian issue. According to recent publications, Washington has given the Israeli leadership a month to decide whether they will proceed with normalization with Saudi Arabia, which requires agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state. If not resolved within the timeframe, the tripartite deal will be bilateral, without Israel.
But there are several questions. First of all, how will Washington and Riyadh solidify their agreements, with the approval of the US Congress, where there are many concerns about the Saudi nuclear program and the kingdom in general? Especially with the presidential elections ahead, it is not in the Republicans' interest to give such a gift to Joe Biden. What the next president decides and who that will be is another question. For example, Donald Trump, who has a chance of winning the presidential race, questioned the idea of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the two-state solution in an interview with Time magazine. But this is still an abstraction.
Another topic that is not discussed openly is the future of Hamas. What will become of the leaders of the movement, especially the military leadership in the Gaza Strip, if the military actions are stopped now? First and foremost, Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and their entourage are involved. Riyadh and many Arab capitals that maintain relations with Israel are by no means ready to deal with them. Even Doha, which has sheltered the political bureau of Hamas on its territory, is unlikely to accept them openly. The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah also will not be able to establish authority in Gaza as long as Hamas's armed groups remain there. Moreover, it is Hamas that will claim credit for any agreement with Israel on ceasing fire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, not to mention the start of negotiations on the creation of a Palestinian state. If it weren't for the war started by Hamas on October 7, the idea of Palestinian independence would be on the back burner of the international agenda. Now, everything is different. One only needs to open Arab media to see this, especially those that hold an active anti-Israeli stance. Protests at American universities, the threat of issuing arrest warrants for Israeli leadership by the International Criminal Court, and the growing number of European capitals ready to recognize the state of Palestine are all seen as a victory for Hamas and a defeat for Israel. Perhaps if Israel had normalized relations with Saudi Arabia before the war and started cooperating with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah along with it, the situation would have been different. But it's impossible to turn back time.
Yes, Israel's decision to continue the operation in Rafah will create problems for the Arab countries and complicate the possibility of negotiations between them and the Israeli authorities for some time. Still, talks about future peace without mentioning and defining the role and place of Hamas are an illusion. Arab capitals, Riyadh, Cairo, Amman, and Abu Dhabi, will never say this out loud, but they, like Israel, fear the strengthening of Hamas. Another matter is that after Rafah and in case of the destruction of the military leadership of Hamas, Israel will still have to return to the question—what to do with the Gaza Strip and how to build relations with Arab countries. A post-war plan is already needed, and there isn't one. There is the preservation of Hamas's military potential, albeit reduced, its full political activity, and other resistance forces—like the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Turkey in the game
Hamas's demands increasingly stipulate that Turkey must be among the guarantors of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and participate in planning the future of the Strip. Ankara, in turn, is advocating for the inclusion of Hamas in the future Palestinian administration.
The head of Hamas's politburo prolonged his stay in Turkey after being hosted by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul at the end of April. According to Asharq Al-Awsat, this is due to several reasons. First, Haniyeh's meetings with some Arab and Palestinian politicians who prefer not to travel to Doha. Second, there is a need to coordinate further strategy with Ankara.
The prospects for Turkey's mediation mission are uncertain, given the rapidly deteriorating relations with Israel. Just on Thursday, Ankara announced the cessation of trade with Israel.
"Turkey will strictly and decisively implement these new measures until the Israeli Government allows an uninterrupted and sufficient flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza," stated the Turkish Ministry of Trade, as quoted by Reuters. In 2023, trade between the countries amounted to about $7 billion.
Earlier in April, Ankara reduced its exports to Israel by imposing restrictions on 54 types of goods. It was a response to the Israeli authorities' refusal to participate in humanitarian operations in the Gaza Strip. Since then, relations between the two countries have only worsened.
Turkey has begun preparations to send another "Freedom Flotilla" to the shores of Gaza with humanitarian cargo and pro-Palestinian activists on board. Among them are Ernesto Che Guevara's 63-year-old daughter, Aleida Guevara, and the 49-year-old grandson of South African revolutionary Nelson Mandela, Zwelivelile "Mandla" Mandela. Given the past experience, the situation looks very dangerous.
In 2010, a flotilla of six ships led by the Turkish ferry Mavi Marmara was intercepted by the Israeli Navy. During the operation, eight Turkish citizens and an American of Turkish descent were killed, which complicated relations between the two countries for several years and subjected Israel to a barrage of international criticism. The current situation is already unfavorable for Israel. Incidents are particularly undesirable against the backdrop of legal cases being considered by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The latter, as feared in Israel, may issue arrest warrants for high-ranking Israeli military and political figures, including the Prime Minister. Thus, the new "Freedom Flotilla" is essentially a deliberate provocation.
While the flotilla's launch did not proceed, as authorities from Guinea-Bissau removed their flags from two of the three ships. Now, the activists are seeking a country willing to provide its flags for their voyage. A request has also been sent to the Turkish authorities.
Formally, Turkey as a state is not involved with the flotilla. The organizers are Turkish and international humanitarian organizations. However, nothing would have happened without Ankara's approval. "The flotilla, led in part by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) — which has close ties with the Turkish government and has previously raised funds for Hamas — intends to bypass established aid channels and refuse to allow Israeli inspection of their cargo, casting doubt on the nature of the mission," stated a letter from 20 members of the US Congress to Secretary of State Antony Blinken. It also included a request for the US authorities to "directly interact" with President Erdogan and the Turkish government to prevent or delay the flotilla's departure and ensure the inspection of all cargoes to Gaza.
Interestingly, amid these developments, there have been reports of the cancellation or postponement of Erdogan's visit to Washington. There are no official explanations for this, and Washington has not even confirmed that such a visit was planned, although Turkish and other media have actively discussed it. Joe Biden remains the only US president in two decades who has not hosted Erdogan at the White House. Presumably, the latest cooling in US-Turkish relations is linked to the war in Gaza. Both sides are unhappy with each other's positions, especially as Erdogan has recently sharpened his rhetoric against Israel.
In addition to the flotilla story and the cancellation of exports, Ankara has also joined South Africa's lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice, which discusses genocide against the Palestinian people, not to mention the hosting of Ismail Haniyeh in Istanbul. Thus, Israel has no doubt about which side Ankara is taking.
Domestic political considerations drive Erdogan's activation on the Palestinian front. Public support is on the side of the Palestinians. The mood in Turkey is illustrated by the terrorist attack that occurred this week in the Old City of Jerusalem. The tourist who attacked a border police officer with a knife turned out to be a Turkish citizen. 34-year-old Hasan Saklanan was an imam at one of the Turkish mosques. After committing the attack, he instantly became a hero on Turkish social media. However, opinions regarding Hamas in Turkey are divided. For instance, the mayor of Istanbul from the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), Ekrem Imamoglu, in an interview with CNN, called Hamas a "terrorist organization," albeit with caveats about the suffering of the people in Gaza. In any case, the Palestinian issue has become a subject of political struggle in Turkey, meaning that influencing Erdogan from the outside will be difficult in the near future. Moreover, no one knows how the elections in the US will turn out.
Lebanese File
Beirut is closely watching the outcomes of the US elections. Hezbollah in Lebanon makes no secret that Washington holds the key to resolving regional issues.
For President Biden, negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza are critically important for both domestic policy, given the backdrop of university protests, and foreign policy. The stake is whether he can reshape the Middle East, although his administration is already running out of time. Washington is lining up the sequence: a ceasefire in Gaza, initiation of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, end of escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli border, unblocking of trade routes in the Red Sea currently under fire from the Houthi movement Ansar Allah, a deal with Riyadh, and reduction of Iranian and Chinese influence in the region.
In theory, it sounds promising. However, there are several downsides. Regarding the Houthis and Iran, Washington itself is seeking help from China, as Antony Blinken stated in Riyadh. China has become more active on the Palestinian front and, along with Russia, is making efforts to reconcile Palestinian forces, primarily the ruling Fatah movement, with Hamas. In Lebanon, the potential resolution of border disputes with Israel is currently seen as an achievement of Hezbollah and other resistance forces, including Hamas.
According to Al-Akhbar, there are several plans for de-escalation between Israel and Lebanon, simultaneously proposed by Washington, London, and Paris. These plans overlap in some areas, such as the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from the demarcation line and the deployment of peacekeeping forces and the official Lebanese army in southern Lebanon. However, each mediator emphasizes different aspects.
Al-Akhbar sources claim that Washington has concluded that nothing will change in Lebanon until a ceasefire is achieved in Gaza, but the Americans want to be ready for this moment. The US plan takes maximum account of removing threats to Israel while leaving some territorial disputes unresolved. The British proposals feature the installation of watchtowers between Lebanon and Israel, with the Lebanese army responsible for any actions against the Israeli side. The French plan is relatively standard: it calls for a ceasefire on both sides, the withdrawal of armed groups, and the resumption of negotiations on border demarcation.
The Israeli site Kan asserts that authorities in Israel are open to discussing "border corrections" to avoid a major war with Hezbollah. However, representatives of this movement repeatedly emphasize that any discussions can only occur after the cessation of the war in the Gaza Strip. They are clearly in no rush and are observing how the regional and global dynamics change, how the issue of Saudi-Israeli normalization will be resolved, what the outcome of the US elections will be, and how the US strategy in the Middle East will shape up. The fact that the Americans have adopted Hezbollah's concept—Gaza first, then everything else—is already seen as a victory for the Lebanese Islamists. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has stated that the movement's primary task, having joined Hamas in the war against Israel, is to prioritize the issue of Gaza and the rights of Palestinians. Thus, regardless of the circumstances, Hezbollah will count this as a victory while enjoying the rivalry among Western diplomacies in the region and making no secret of it.